Evidently the reinforcing pirates turned back when it dawned on them what a monumentally bad idea it was to go near the Navy.
And Navy SEALS did what they do so well and we had a good outcome. Bravo to them and due credit to Obama. He made the policy call and then let the experts do the deed. This is a formula for success.
Showing posts with label Navy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Navy. Show all posts
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Pirates!!
The pirate problem, unaddressed, naturally gets worse: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e10892ba-b4a8-11dd-b780-0000779fd18c.html
There's a lot of hand-wringing going on right now and eventually action will be required.
And everybody already knows what that action will have to be.
Intercepting pirates on the high seas is a stop gap measure and one very limited in effectiveness. It's better than doing nothing, but is no solution. The ocean is too big.
Since Roman times every maritime nation dealing with piracy has found that the only permanent solution is to clear out the pirate bases. If there's no power strong enough or with enough will to do the messy work then the pirates will flourish. Sooner or later the Somali coast will have to be cleaned up and the pirates suppressed at the source. The best solution would be for local authorities to do this, but it's been a generation since Somalia had a real government and there's slim prospects for any change on that front. So it will have to be the maritime powers, and especially the U.S. Navy doing it.
There's a lot of hand-wringing going on right now and eventually action will be required.
And everybody already knows what that action will have to be.
Intercepting pirates on the high seas is a stop gap measure and one very limited in effectiveness. It's better than doing nothing, but is no solution. The ocean is too big.
Since Roman times every maritime nation dealing with piracy has found that the only permanent solution is to clear out the pirate bases. If there's no power strong enough or with enough will to do the messy work then the pirates will flourish. Sooner or later the Somali coast will have to be cleaned up and the pirates suppressed at the source. The best solution would be for local authorities to do this, but it's been a generation since Somalia had a real government and there's slim prospects for any change on that front. So it will have to be the maritime powers, and especially the U.S. Navy doing it.
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
The Death of the Cruiser
It seems evident the United States will be building no more warships called cruisers, and, as the U.S. Navy is about the only one building many large surface combatants of any kind, it seems likely that the cruiser, as a class of warship, will be joining the battleship as a relic of an earlier age.
There's been no formal announcement that the Navy won't have any more cruiser, but applying a little analysis to the current state of Navy ship-building leads to the conclusion that there won't be any more cruisers, ever.
The difference between "cruisers' and "destroyers" has been eroding for close to 50 years, as destroyer classes have continued to grow and destroyers have evolved from special-purpose escorts into general-purpose surface combatants, which used to be the role of cruisers. The re designations of "frigates" "destroyers" "destroyer leaders" and "cruisers" over the years has been evidence of this process. The last large class of cruisers built for the U.S. Navy, the Ticonderoga class, was built on the same hull as the large Spruance class destroyers. And the Arliegh Burke class destroyers are about the same size as the Spruances and Ticonderogas.
The newest, Zumwalt-class destroyers, are slated to displace about 14,000 tons, which makes them larger than all but the largest classes of World War II-era heavy cruisers and larger than the vast majority of post-war cruisers. In fact, I think only the nuclear cruiser USS Long Beach had a larger displacement among U.S. Navy cruisers built since 1950.
It's been politically expedient for quite a while to build "destroyers" instead of cruisers because destroyers sound like smaller, cheaper warships than cruisers to ignorant congressmen and the public. This won't be the first time the Navy pulled a fast one on Congress with semantics. (The Nineteenth Century Navy got more than one new warship by persuading Congress to pay for "repairing" an old one.)
But, with destroyers weighing at 14,000 tons or more in there's simply no longer any room for a "cruiser" in the scheme of things. There are no larger surface combatant warships planned. Ships larger than 20,000 tons displacement are generally aviation ships such as attack carriers, amphibious ships or those new Japanese "destroyers" that look like small aircraft carriers.
The only navy to build a class of very large surface combatants was the Soviet Russian navy with its Kirov-class nuclear battle cruisers. While impressive looking, the actual utility of such vessels is unclear and there have been no similar vessels built by anyone.
So logic dictates that there will be no more cruisers. The term "destroyer" no longer means an agile, small and expendable escort vessel. Those are "frigates" and "corvettes" now. Today a destroyer is a large, multi-purpose major surface combatant. Tactically there's no difference in role between a Ticonderoga-class Aegis "cruiser" and the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis "destroyer."
There's been no formal announcement that the Navy won't have any more cruiser, but applying a little analysis to the current state of Navy ship-building leads to the conclusion that there won't be any more cruisers, ever.
The difference between "cruisers' and "destroyers" has been eroding for close to 50 years, as destroyer classes have continued to grow and destroyers have evolved from special-purpose escorts into general-purpose surface combatants, which used to be the role of cruisers. The re designations of "frigates" "destroyers" "destroyer leaders" and "cruisers" over the years has been evidence of this process. The last large class of cruisers built for the U.S. Navy, the Ticonderoga class, was built on the same hull as the large Spruance class destroyers. And the Arliegh Burke class destroyers are about the same size as the Spruances and Ticonderogas.
The newest, Zumwalt-class destroyers, are slated to displace about 14,000 tons, which makes them larger than all but the largest classes of World War II-era heavy cruisers and larger than the vast majority of post-war cruisers. In fact, I think only the nuclear cruiser USS Long Beach had a larger displacement among U.S. Navy cruisers built since 1950.
It's been politically expedient for quite a while to build "destroyers" instead of cruisers because destroyers sound like smaller, cheaper warships than cruisers to ignorant congressmen and the public. This won't be the first time the Navy pulled a fast one on Congress with semantics. (The Nineteenth Century Navy got more than one new warship by persuading Congress to pay for "repairing" an old one.)
But, with destroyers weighing at 14,000 tons or more in there's simply no longer any room for a "cruiser" in the scheme of things. There are no larger surface combatant warships planned. Ships larger than 20,000 tons displacement are generally aviation ships such as attack carriers, amphibious ships or those new Japanese "destroyers" that look like small aircraft carriers.
The only navy to build a class of very large surface combatants was the Soviet Russian navy with its Kirov-class nuclear battle cruisers. While impressive looking, the actual utility of such vessels is unclear and there have been no similar vessels built by anyone.
So logic dictates that there will be no more cruisers. The term "destroyer" no longer means an agile, small and expendable escort vessel. Those are "frigates" and "corvettes" now. Today a destroyer is a large, multi-purpose major surface combatant. Tactically there's no difference in role between a Ticonderoga-class Aegis "cruiser" and the Arleigh Burke-class Aegis "destroyer."
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Interesting naval photo: Ships from five navies
Naval vessels from five nations sail in parade formation for a rare photographic opportunity at sea. From top row left to right: the Italian Navy (Marina Militare) ship Maestrale Class Frigate MM MAESTRALE (F 570), French Navy Tourville Class Destroyer DE GRASSE (D 612), Nimitz Class Aircraft Carrier USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74), US Navy (USN) Ticonderoga Class Cruisers USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73), French Navy Charles de Gaulle Class Aircraft Carrier CHARLES DE GAULLE (R 91), Royal Navy Helicopter Carrier, Her Majestys Ship (HMS) OCEAN (L 12), French La Fayette Class Frigate SURCOUF (F 711), Aircraft Carrier USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67), Netherlands Navy Karel Doorman Class Frigate Her Majestys Netherlands Ship (Harer Majesteits) (HNLMS) VAN AMSTEL (F 831), Italian Navy De La Penne (ex-Animoso) Class Destroyer, MM LUIGI DURAND DE LA PENNE (ex Animoso) (D 560). The coalition forces are deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. (Released to Public)
DoD photo by: PH3 ALTA I. CUTLER, USN Date Shot: 18 Apr 2002
DoD photo by: PH3 ALTA I. CUTLER, USN Date Shot: 18 Apr 2002
Saturday, January 12, 2008
Iranian games
The recent incident between Iran and the U.S. Navy is interesting on a few levels.
Politically the Bush administration didn't handle it all that well, which is no surprise. A lot of folks compared it to the Tonkin Gulf incident. Some wag in my newsroom posted a map of the Strait of Hormuz and labeled it the Gulf of Tonkin. It's a bad analogy, not the least because THIS incident really did happen, unlike the Tonkin incident.
Secondly, Johnson was looking for a reason to strike. While there are elements in the current administration that would like to strike, it's not at all clear that Bush, himself, does, and that's all the difference in the world. If this same incident had happened last summer it might have led to fighting, but the momentum for that has shifted against it for now and it appears something more overt will be required to ignite fighting.
Militarily, on the other hand, there's a lot to be noted. It's evidence that the Iranian plan is to use swarms of very small boats to attack U.S. Navy warships. This is most likely to work if the Iranians can surprise us. In Sunday's confrontation, for example, it appeared to me that the Navy warships would have been vulnerable if the Iranian boats had suddenly launched a coordinated attack,. They were very, very close.
On the other hand, an out-of-the-blue ambush of some U.S. Navy ships that provokes a massive counterstrike doesn't seem like something the Iranians would consider in their interests. The U.S. can afford to lose a destroyer more than the Iranians can afford to have the crap bombed out of them. An unprovoked surprise attack would throw away any political benefit the Iranians would hope to otherwise get.
On the other hand, if the U.S. were to launch airstrikes on the Iranians they may very well try to retaliate against U.S. Navy ships within reach.
The question is whether "swarm" tactics by light ships could work. There's some reason to think that there's a chance they can get through. Very small craft are very difficult targets. Too small to shoot at with missiles, hard to hit from jet aircraft, they're vulnerable to gunfire but if there were enough of them there may be too many to engage.
The swarm still has its work cut out for it, though, especially if it's expected. Coordinating a large number of small boats using nothing other than voice radio would be very difficult. Meanwhile the U.S. Navy ships can rely on a sophisticated network to coordinate their actions and call for help. The ships can be data-linked together so they can allocate fires efficiently. The U.S. Navy is very well-trained and professional and one must assume that they've considered this tactical challenge and come up with countermeasures.
Perhaps the biggest problem for the Iranians is targeting the swarm. The small boats have limited endurance, they can' just be sent out randomly to search for U.S. ships. Without good, real-time information the Iranian command won't know where to send the swarm.
It's the information battle that the Iranians are least equipped to win. The Americans will see the Iranians coming. Any ships endangered by the swarm will be able to dodge away while the U.S. uses its air power to chew chew them up.
The swarm tactic holds some danger for the U.S., but it would need all the cars to fall just right to actually work. On the other hand, it's really the only tactical option open to the Iranians, so they have to try it or give up.
Politically the Bush administration didn't handle it all that well, which is no surprise. A lot of folks compared it to the Tonkin Gulf incident. Some wag in my newsroom posted a map of the Strait of Hormuz and labeled it the Gulf of Tonkin. It's a bad analogy, not the least because THIS incident really did happen, unlike the Tonkin incident.
Secondly, Johnson was looking for a reason to strike. While there are elements in the current administration that would like to strike, it's not at all clear that Bush, himself, does, and that's all the difference in the world. If this same incident had happened last summer it might have led to fighting, but the momentum for that has shifted against it for now and it appears something more overt will be required to ignite fighting.
Militarily, on the other hand, there's a lot to be noted. It's evidence that the Iranian plan is to use swarms of very small boats to attack U.S. Navy warships. This is most likely to work if the Iranians can surprise us. In Sunday's confrontation, for example, it appeared to me that the Navy warships would have been vulnerable if the Iranian boats had suddenly launched a coordinated attack,. They were very, very close.
On the other hand, an out-of-the-blue ambush of some U.S. Navy ships that provokes a massive counterstrike doesn't seem like something the Iranians would consider in their interests. The U.S. can afford to lose a destroyer more than the Iranians can afford to have the crap bombed out of them. An unprovoked surprise attack would throw away any political benefit the Iranians would hope to otherwise get.
On the other hand, if the U.S. were to launch airstrikes on the Iranians they may very well try to retaliate against U.S. Navy ships within reach.
The question is whether "swarm" tactics by light ships could work. There's some reason to think that there's a chance they can get through. Very small craft are very difficult targets. Too small to shoot at with missiles, hard to hit from jet aircraft, they're vulnerable to gunfire but if there were enough of them there may be too many to engage.
The swarm still has its work cut out for it, though, especially if it's expected. Coordinating a large number of small boats using nothing other than voice radio would be very difficult. Meanwhile the U.S. Navy ships can rely on a sophisticated network to coordinate their actions and call for help. The ships can be data-linked together so they can allocate fires efficiently. The U.S. Navy is very well-trained and professional and one must assume that they've considered this tactical challenge and come up with countermeasures.
Perhaps the biggest problem for the Iranians is targeting the swarm. The small boats have limited endurance, they can' just be sent out randomly to search for U.S. ships. Without good, real-time information the Iranian command won't know where to send the swarm.
It's the information battle that the Iranians are least equipped to win. The Americans will see the Iranians coming. Any ships endangered by the swarm will be able to dodge away while the U.S. uses its air power to chew chew them up.
The swarm tactic holds some danger for the U.S., but it would need all the cars to fall just right to actually work. On the other hand, it's really the only tactical option open to the Iranians, so they have to try it or give up.
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