A funny post from Roger Simon
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=362E5C1F-3048-5C12-00E8E3FF95048442
Friday, May 30, 2008
The shape of the next war
This article about Chinese cyber attacks points out some valuable points to consider for anyone touting America's military might: http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php
First of all, there's no question America is "mighty" by any measure of conventional military capability.
The Army and Marine Corps are strained by Iraq right now, and dangerously degraded, but even degraded they are far-and-away more capable than almost any other ground military force on the globe. The only armies with comparable capabilities are firm allies. The main limitation on American ground capability is size. Many ground scenarios require a lot of boost on the ground and there the U.S. capability is always limited (and more so because of the war)
In the air and at sea, however, there is simply no contest. There are no air forces in the world that are not allies that have a prayer of successfully defending their air space. There are no navies afloat, including allies, that can contest anything more than their immediate coastal waters. When Britain "ruled the waves" it was content to have a Navy that equalled the next two biggest. The U.S. Navy is larger (not counting minor ships) than all the rest of the world's navies put together. No one since Imperial Rome has had that level of superiority.
Aside from the depredations of submarines, there's no nation that can fight us at sea. While subs are worrisome, history suggests that they cannot be decisive alone. The only successful submarine campaign (U.S. vs. Japan) was won by the stronger navy against the weaker one. Attempts by the weaker naval power to parley a sub campaign into strategic success fell short (Germany in two world wars, Japan in WW2).
The fate of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 is not lost on our potentiall opponents either.
No nation can challenge us in conventional warfare with any hope of success. Being, however, unwilling to simply surrender their interests and let the U.S. humiliate them, bully them and otherwise have its way, countries with interests opposed to ours will obviously search for other ways to fight.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the creativity of potential opponents, especially those with long military traditions such as Iran and China. While their economic power doesn't allow them to match the U.S. in conventional military capability, both of those nations have very long military traditions independent of the Western one.
The Iranians, for example, no doubt noted that an American admiral was able to use unconventional tactics to neutralize a Navy battle group in a notorious wargame. The admiral resigned when the game was rigged and restarted to void the defeat. Have the recent incidents involving small boats stalking U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf been tests of that tactic? Possibly. It would be wise to consider the probability that an attack on Iran might unleash incidents of unconventional was and terrorism in widely separated areas of the world. Still, while the Iranians can hope to achieve some embarrassing successes, they represent an inherently limited threat. Even the loss of an aircraft carrier, while an enormous embarrassment and a naval tragedy, would not change the relative balance of power one bit. Details: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/12/america/12navy.php?page=1
Much more dangerous is China, which is a continental-sized power that is growing in economic might. The Chinese are still a couple of generations, at least, from being able to match the U.S. in conventional military arms -- if they were even interested in doing so. But the Chinese are heirs to a military tradition that stretches back several thousand years. One that never had a "dark ages" that broke its connection to classical times. That Chinese military tradition has always emphasized the value of outthinking, out maneuvering and surprising the foe. Western military thought has tended to regard many tactics as too "sneaky" or "ungentlemanly" for real warriors. Unconventional warfare has posed many challenges for westerners because it rarely results in stand-up "fair" fights. Chinese military thought doesn't really make a distinction between "unconventional" and "conventional" fighting. To the Chinese all warfare involves yin and yang, the interaction between the ordinary and the extraordinary fighting elements. And importantly, yin and yang, ordinary and extraordinary, are not inherent properties of the force. Depending on circumstances the yin can become the yang. The extraordinary can become the ordinary. A general might mass his armored forces on the plain to fix the attention of the enemy while some light infantry flanks through difficult terrain to cut off a retreat.
This directly relates to the cyber skirmishing that's been going on for some years now between hackers suspected to be Chinese and various American business and government computer systems.
The Chinese, knowing that they can't compete with bombs, aircraft carriers and missiles, may be seeking to turn the conflict into one they can compete in -- a war of cyber attacks, anti-sat actions, mines, subs and terror.
They're teasing around with conventional surface naval capabilities, but very seriously building a significant sub force. There's no reason to think they would try to emulate the U-boat campaign with those subs. There's no reason to think that the U.S. would be vulnerable to a sea interdiction campaign in any sort of useful time frame for a Sino-American conflict. But subs could be used as platforms for other kinds of attacks and raids that could be very damaging.
The Chinese have demonstrated an interest in anti-sat weapons. The U.S. is heavily reliant on satellites for all sorts of uses and it could take many years to rebuild our networks if they were destroyed.
The overseas Chinese community is enormous and the Chinese have had some success in recruiting among those populations to further their interests. In a conflict one should expect some support from them, which could take many, many forms -- not necessarily direct action.
And finally, the cyber threat. Apparently there are many ways that attacks through the Internet could be waged. The very characteristics that make the Internet so useful also make it very vulnerable. The Y2K threat turned out to be minimal, but looking back at those concerns points out the ways that the system could be vulnerable -- maybe not to bad code, but to hostile action.
If a conflict were to break out between the U.S. and China, it will take some unexpected directions.
First of all, there's no question America is "mighty" by any measure of conventional military capability.
The Army and Marine Corps are strained by Iraq right now, and dangerously degraded, but even degraded they are far-and-away more capable than almost any other ground military force on the globe. The only armies with comparable capabilities are firm allies. The main limitation on American ground capability is size. Many ground scenarios require a lot of boost on the ground and there the U.S. capability is always limited (and more so because of the war)
In the air and at sea, however, there is simply no contest. There are no air forces in the world that are not allies that have a prayer of successfully defending their air space. There are no navies afloat, including allies, that can contest anything more than their immediate coastal waters. When Britain "ruled the waves" it was content to have a Navy that equalled the next two biggest. The U.S. Navy is larger (not counting minor ships) than all the rest of the world's navies put together. No one since Imperial Rome has had that level of superiority.
Aside from the depredations of submarines, there's no nation that can fight us at sea. While subs are worrisome, history suggests that they cannot be decisive alone. The only successful submarine campaign (U.S. vs. Japan) was won by the stronger navy against the weaker one. Attempts by the weaker naval power to parley a sub campaign into strategic success fell short (Germany in two world wars, Japan in WW2).
The fate of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 is not lost on our potentiall opponents either.
No nation can challenge us in conventional warfare with any hope of success. Being, however, unwilling to simply surrender their interests and let the U.S. humiliate them, bully them and otherwise have its way, countries with interests opposed to ours will obviously search for other ways to fight.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the creativity of potential opponents, especially those with long military traditions such as Iran and China. While their economic power doesn't allow them to match the U.S. in conventional military capability, both of those nations have very long military traditions independent of the Western one.
The Iranians, for example, no doubt noted that an American admiral was able to use unconventional tactics to neutralize a Navy battle group in a notorious wargame. The admiral resigned when the game was rigged and restarted to void the defeat. Have the recent incidents involving small boats stalking U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf been tests of that tactic? Possibly. It would be wise to consider the probability that an attack on Iran might unleash incidents of unconventional was and terrorism in widely separated areas of the world. Still, while the Iranians can hope to achieve some embarrassing successes, they represent an inherently limited threat. Even the loss of an aircraft carrier, while an enormous embarrassment and a naval tragedy, would not change the relative balance of power one bit. Details: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/12/america/12navy.php?page=1
Much more dangerous is China, which is a continental-sized power that is growing in economic might. The Chinese are still a couple of generations, at least, from being able to match the U.S. in conventional military arms -- if they were even interested in doing so. But the Chinese are heirs to a military tradition that stretches back several thousand years. One that never had a "dark ages" that broke its connection to classical times. That Chinese military tradition has always emphasized the value of outthinking, out maneuvering and surprising the foe. Western military thought has tended to regard many tactics as too "sneaky" or "ungentlemanly" for real warriors. Unconventional warfare has posed many challenges for westerners because it rarely results in stand-up "fair" fights. Chinese military thought doesn't really make a distinction between "unconventional" and "conventional" fighting. To the Chinese all warfare involves yin and yang, the interaction between the ordinary and the extraordinary fighting elements. And importantly, yin and yang, ordinary and extraordinary, are not inherent properties of the force. Depending on circumstances the yin can become the yang. The extraordinary can become the ordinary. A general might mass his armored forces on the plain to fix the attention of the enemy while some light infantry flanks through difficult terrain to cut off a retreat.
This directly relates to the cyber skirmishing that's been going on for some years now between hackers suspected to be Chinese and various American business and government computer systems.
The Chinese, knowing that they can't compete with bombs, aircraft carriers and missiles, may be seeking to turn the conflict into one they can compete in -- a war of cyber attacks, anti-sat actions, mines, subs and terror.
They're teasing around with conventional surface naval capabilities, but very seriously building a significant sub force. There's no reason to think they would try to emulate the U-boat campaign with those subs. There's no reason to think that the U.S. would be vulnerable to a sea interdiction campaign in any sort of useful time frame for a Sino-American conflict. But subs could be used as platforms for other kinds of attacks and raids that could be very damaging.
The Chinese have demonstrated an interest in anti-sat weapons. The U.S. is heavily reliant on satellites for all sorts of uses and it could take many years to rebuild our networks if they were destroyed.
The overseas Chinese community is enormous and the Chinese have had some success in recruiting among those populations to further their interests. In a conflict one should expect some support from them, which could take many, many forms -- not necessarily direct action.
And finally, the cyber threat. Apparently there are many ways that attacks through the Internet could be waged. The very characteristics that make the Internet so useful also make it very vulnerable. The Y2K threat turned out to be minimal, but looking back at those concerns points out the ways that the system could be vulnerable -- maybe not to bad code, but to hostile action.
If a conflict were to break out between the U.S. and China, it will take some unexpected directions.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Pat Buchanan makes a hash of history, too
Pat Buchanan criticizes Bush for making a "hash of history," but likewise does the same.
Read the whole thing here: http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=26606
But Buchanan (who manages to be just about the only person who thinks it was Britain's fault there was a World War II, not the peace-loving Hitler) criticizes Bush's misuse of the term "appeasement" to apply to talking to enemies instead of giving in to the enemy.
He justifies the British decision to avoid war with Germany over the Sudeten Germans by handing over a good chunk of Czechoslovakia to the Nazis because, after all, the Sudeten Germans hated the Czechs. The fact the Czechs were not consulted over the dismemberment of their country is not mentioned.
Buchanan then blames the start of the war on the British guarantee to Poland. Secure in the knowledge the British were on their side the Poles refused to negotiate the status of Danzig. Buchanan apparently views the German demands as reasonable ones, without apparently realizing that going to war over the grievance (justified or not) was a not reasonable or civilized response.
Conveniently left out of his discussion, however, is the fate of the Czechs. After promising Chamberlain that the Sudetenland was the extent of his ambitions and that he'd respect the independence of the Czechs, Hitler turned around and seized the rest of that hapless country in March, 1939, just a few months later. It was that betrayal that led to the Polish guarantee as Britain and France realized that they needed to draw a line in the sand against Nazi aggression.
Appeasement, like torture, is not only dishonorable, but ineffective as well. This is the source for it's well-earned contempt.
Leaving this part out of his story demonstrates that Buchanan is not intellectually honest. To his credit, he's been a stern critic of Bush and his imperialistic policies. But to his discredit, his opposition is tinged with more than a little bit of unsavory Know-nothingism and America First-ism of the sort that was popular in certain circles in the 1930s. Circles that found rather too much admirable with the German experiment.
Read the whole thing here: http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=26606
But Buchanan (who manages to be just about the only person who thinks it was Britain's fault there was a World War II, not the peace-loving Hitler) criticizes Bush's misuse of the term "appeasement" to apply to talking to enemies instead of giving in to the enemy.
He justifies the British decision to avoid war with Germany over the Sudeten Germans by handing over a good chunk of Czechoslovakia to the Nazis because, after all, the Sudeten Germans hated the Czechs. The fact the Czechs were not consulted over the dismemberment of their country is not mentioned.
Buchanan then blames the start of the war on the British guarantee to Poland. Secure in the knowledge the British were on their side the Poles refused to negotiate the status of Danzig. Buchanan apparently views the German demands as reasonable ones, without apparently realizing that going to war over the grievance (justified or not) was a not reasonable or civilized response.
Conveniently left out of his discussion, however, is the fate of the Czechs. After promising Chamberlain that the Sudetenland was the extent of his ambitions and that he'd respect the independence of the Czechs, Hitler turned around and seized the rest of that hapless country in March, 1939, just a few months later. It was that betrayal that led to the Polish guarantee as Britain and France realized that they needed to draw a line in the sand against Nazi aggression.
Appeasement, like torture, is not only dishonorable, but ineffective as well. This is the source for it's well-earned contempt.
Leaving this part out of his story demonstrates that Buchanan is not intellectually honest. To his credit, he's been a stern critic of Bush and his imperialistic policies. But to his discredit, his opposition is tinged with more than a little bit of unsavory Know-nothingism and America First-ism of the sort that was popular in certain circles in the 1930s. Circles that found rather too much admirable with the German experiment.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Scott hit too close to home
The vehement response to McClellan's book demonstrates how close to the mark he was. His is a very dangerous criticism for Bush, which the Bushists recognize.
Still, even now, McClellan is not as harsh as he could be. He could, and maybe should, call out Libby and, especially Rove, as liars who lied to him, personally.
Still, even now, McClellan is not as harsh as he could be. He could, and maybe should, call out Libby and, especially Rove, as liars who lied to him, personally.
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Press Secretary tells all ...
.. or at least lots.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10649_Page2.html
I always felt a little sorry for Scott McLellan because he really did seem like a decent sort of fellow who was uncomfortable in the role Bush placed him in. Most of Bush's other press spokesmen seemed to enjoy playing the press, like it was a game.
Clearly the press secretary's job is to put the best face on things possible, but there are boundaries of decency even for that kind of work. As in so many things, Bush has set a low bar.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10649_Page2.html
I always felt a little sorry for Scott McLellan because he really did seem like a decent sort of fellow who was uncomfortable in the role Bush placed him in. Most of Bush's other press spokesmen seemed to enjoy playing the press, like it was a game.
Clearly the press secretary's job is to put the best face on things possible, but there are boundaries of decency even for that kind of work. As in so many things, Bush has set a low bar.
Memorial Day
I had, perhaps, the easiest tour of war duty ever served. I'm proud I went and took my chances, but I've few illusions about the nature of war and I'm thankful I was lucky.
But every day I think about the people who are still serving. I've known quite a few who have gone. I know some who are there right now or are soon to be there. And I've attended a funeral.
My prayers go with all of them.
Sometimes you find out about someone who you never even meet but still manages to make a connection.
One such soldier is remembered here: http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/05/memorial-day.html
Today's Memorial Day ceremony in Norwich featured a World War II veteran. Interestingly the gentleman was alone. It wasn't so long ago that members of the Greatest Generation thoroughly dominated the scene at Memorial Day. Now they're outnumbered by Korean War and Vietnam War veterans. And perhaps soon by veterans of Iraq.
But every day I think about the people who are still serving. I've known quite a few who have gone. I know some who are there right now or are soon to be there. And I've attended a funeral.
My prayers go with all of them.
Sometimes you find out about someone who you never even meet but still manages to make a connection.
One such soldier is remembered here: http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2008/05/memorial-day.html
Today's Memorial Day ceremony in Norwich featured a World War II veteran. Interestingly the gentleman was alone. It wasn't so long ago that members of the Greatest Generation thoroughly dominated the scene at Memorial Day. Now they're outnumbered by Korean War and Vietnam War veterans. And perhaps soon by veterans of Iraq.
Friday, May 23, 2008
Is there any excuse for her to stay in now?
"My husband did not wrap up the nomination in 1992 until he won the California primary somewhere in the middle of June, right? We all remember Bobby Kennedy was assassinated in June in California. I don't understand it."
Sen. Hillary Clinton
If, God forbid, anything did happen to Sen. Obama, how could she be offered the nomination after saying such a stupid, tasteless, disgusting, narcissistic, inhuman thing?
Bring back Gore. Give it to Edwards. Anyone but her.
Sen. Hillary Clinton
If, God forbid, anything did happen to Sen. Obama, how could she be offered the nomination after saying such a stupid, tasteless, disgusting, narcissistic, inhuman thing?
Bring back Gore. Give it to Edwards. Anyone but her.
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